This report argues that the China–Russia–Iran–North Korea (CRINK) alignment is best understood not as a cohesive bloc or alliance system, but as a networked convergence shaped by shared grievance, selective coordination, and uneven trust. The “axis” framing is analytically tempting because it evokes a consolidated coalition with unified intent. Yet the empirical record suggests something narrower and more conditional: a flexible alignment in which cooperation occurs where incentives overlap, but where mistrust, divergent risk tolerances, and structural asymmetries impose persistent ceilings on integration.
From China’s perspective, the perceived value of the CRINK grouping is not obvious: how does cooperation and coordination with Russia, Iran, and North Korea support China’s interests, or how is being perceived as aligned with the other three countries especially helpful? Other than a shared commitment to illiberalism and diluting Western influence, they often seem to be working at odds with China’s preferences. Each of the three often undermines Chinese economic interests in key regions through disruptive foreign policies. Russia’s aggression towards the European Union – China’s largest export market – does not help Beijing. Nor does Iran’s destabilizing role in the Middle East, the source of much of China’s energy imports, and lucrative trade and contracting revenue. North Korea’s threats to neighboring South Korea and Japan, and by extension their ally the U.S., also put pressure on China in its immediate periphery. From a strictly rational perspective, this CRINKs alignment creates a more challenging environment for China’s ambitions. This report unpacks these relationships from the perspective of Beijing.