The following is a single chapter of a wider report examining the armed forces of Central Asia, with each chapter examining one of the five Central Asian republics. For access to the full interactive maps or the accompanying miniseries, links and information are available in the appendix of this chapter.
Overview
With a population exceeding 34 million, Uzbekistan holds an important geographical and political role within Central Asia. Uzbekistan not only borders all of the other Central Asian nations, but also accounts for approximately 50 per cent of the region's total population. Historically, Uzbekistan has positioned itself as the primary military power within the region, boasting the largest military budget and the most substantial standing army. However, at present, Uzbekistan now appears to be retreating from this position, arguably slipping into second place in total force numbers and ranking second or third in technological and strategic innovation, with Kazakhstan surpassing Uzbekistan in several key military categories. While this retreat by Uzbekistan can be partly attributed to Kazakhstan's recent armament efforts, it can also be partly blamed on Tashkent's repeated military spending cutbacks and budgetary erosion, as its currency continues to lose ground in terms of purchasing power. Military capability projections not only indicate that this gap between Tashkent and Astana is only set to widen, but also suggest Kazakhstan is likely to overtake Uzbekistan in absolute military spending within the next few years. In such an event, Tashkent will be forced to navigate shifting power dynamics against a backdrop of increasingly complex regional geopolitics, while also possessing a declining military budget that will only compound the growing security threats.
The strategic challenges faced by Uzbekistan often ultimately stem from its geography, so much so, that should Uzbekistan find itself in a conflict with any of its neighbours, its borders, terrain, and chokepoints will serve to significantly complicate operations, rather than aid in the national defence, even before considering the country's issues surrounding logistics, finances, and command and control structures. It is also because of Uzbekistan's varied terrain and climates that Tashkent is forced to maintain a much more versatile military, capable of functioning across a diverse range of environments. Tashkent has to maintain an armed force capable of not only operating in the vast desert expanses of the western regions, but also the tight, jagged mountain passes and valleys of the east, as well as the rolling rocky foothills and plains of the south.
However, Uzbekistan faces additional challenges beyond geography, particularly in its easternmost territories within the Fergana Valley. Unlike most countries, where valleys and mountain chains often provide easily delineable and defensible national boundaries, the officially recognised borders of the Fergana Valley often do not follow natural geographic features, instead appearing as a hodgepodge of poorly delineated markers and signposts. This not only results in frequent border disputes among the region's various ethnic groups, but also perpetuates a constant level of political uncertainty for Tashkent regarding the region's ethnic and political stability.
As an example of just how confusing these borders can be, the Sokh exclave is administered and recognised as a territory of Uzbekistan despite being entirely surrounded by Kyrgyzstan and populated predominantly by ethnic Tajiks.
However, these politically charged land issues and precarious situations are just part of the problem for Tashkent. Although the valley comprises only a tiny percentage of Uzbekistan's total land area, it contains 30 per cent of the country's total population, the majority of its arable farmland, and the primary trade routes connecting Tashkent and the west of the country to places like Osh and Isfara.
The Fergana Valley is essential to Uzbekistan for financial, political, and strategic reasons. However, to Tashkent's detriment, the valley is almost entirely geographically isolated from the rest of the country by the imposing Qurama Mountains.
The Qurama Mountains form a natural barrier, isolating the Fergana Valley from Tashkent and the rest of Uzbekistan's landmass, creating a significant divide that has helped shape Uzbekistan's modern security and defence doctrine. This separation underscores the critical importance Uzbekistan's military has placed on maintaining the security of the Kamchiq Pass, as before the expansion of this pass, Tashkent's alternate route into the valley detoured south around the mountain chain, passing through what is now Tajikistan for part of the journey. While this route was unproblematic during the Soviet era, post-independence, it posed a significant strategic vulnerability for Tashkent. Without control of the Kamchiq Pass, Tashkent would likely be forced to rely upon the goodwill of Dushanbe to be able to unilaterally maintain its land connection with the rest of the Uzbek population within the valley. So as to avoid becoming too reliant on Dushanbe, over the decades, Uzbekistan has invested significant military and political effort into maintaining guaranteed control over this crucial mountain pass.
However, despite Tashkent's anxiety around the pass, most regional defence experts would argue that the likelihood of a conventional military invasion by one of Uzbekistan's neighbours towards this region still remains incredibly low. At present, most of the Central Asian states lack the desire and the ability to carry out such an expeditionary operation, and all of these states currently benefit far more from the increased goods and services transiting in and out of the valley than they would from any sort of conflict aimed at adjusting borders. Instead, the genuine concern for Uzbek policymakers appears to be increasingly driven by non-traditional security challenges, such as internal unrest, religious extremism, narcotics trafficking, and organised crime-related activities.
In particular, religious extremist groups appear to be the primary concern for Uzbek defence policy. In the past, groups like the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan caused significant security concerns for the Uzbek government, as during the 1990s, the IMU rapidly expanded its militant activities throughout Uzbekistan, notably culminating in a series of bombings across Tashkent in 1999, with multiple different Islamic groups subsequently using the valley to engage in a prolonged campaign of kidnappings, attacks, and calls for violence against the administration throughout the following years. Today, it could be said that these concerns around religious extremism, as well as fear of movements pushing for regional separatism in the valley, have resulted in most of Tashkent's domestic military attention now being focused toward just three areas of the country: the capital, the southern border area with Afghanistan, and the entirety of the Fergana Valley.
Uzbekistan's modern strategic thinking and defence doctrine have been primarily shaped by a handful of key historical events. Undoubtedly, other external factors have also played a role in shaping the views of Tashkent's leadership, but this analysis will focus on a small selection of key turning points. These events include the breakup of the Soviet Union and the establishment of the modern Uzbek army; the uprisings in Andijan and the government's disastrous response; the emergence of transnational threats like the IMU, and then later the Islamic State Khorasan Province; and the emergence of renewed geopolitical competition in the region.
About the authors:Michael Hilliard is the Director of Defence & Security Analysis for the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs.
Michael S. Coffey is an Assistant Professor of History and Political Science at the College of Southern Maryland.
Mitchell Polman is an Independent Researcher and Political Analyst specializing in post-Soviet national politics.
Juan Carlos Pastor Gómez is an Assistant Professor of International Relations at the Complutense University of Madrid.